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WHITHER (WITHER?) GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS? THE CASE 
AGAINST GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AND FOR 
APPELLATIONS OF ORIGIN IN AN ERA OF GLOCALIZATION 
 
BENJAMIN ROBERT HOPPER1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
One of the most hotly contested legal debates in international 
intellectual property law today concerns geographical indications (GIs) 
and appellations of origin (AOOs), referred to herein using the umbrella 
term “indication of origin” (IO). Central to the debate are two different 
systems for IOs—the sui generis system of AOOs and the like promoted by 
IO advocates like the EU (generally civil law jurisdictions) and the system 
promoted by IO skeptics like the US (generally common law jurisdictions) 
under which GIs are subsumed within a pre-existing trademark system. 
These divergent IO systems are manifestations of deepening fragmentation 
in the international IO order, which has led to a deadlock in international 
IO law. Although key international agreements dealing with IOs have 
sought to “bridge the gap” between the two systems by permitting 
signatories to protect IOs under either system, this article finds that there is 
an inherent, irreconcilable tension between the two systems, making the 
gap unbridgeable. The article concludes that it is in the interests of all that 
a sui generis and limited system of AOO protection be adopted within an 
international, harmonized framework. By contrast, trademark-based GIs 
ought to be allowed to wither on the vine. 
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PART I: INTRODUCTION 
I.A: The GI vs. AOO debate 
One of the most hotly contested legal debates in international 
intellectual property law today concerns geographical indications (GIs) and 
appellations of origin (AOOs),2 referred to herein using the umbrella term 
“indication of origin” (IO). A review of international agreements 
concerning IOs, and the different mechanisms by which countries seek to 
provide for their protection, reveals fragmentation. The source of this 
fragmentation may be located in the ever-widening disjuncture between the 
nation and state in “nation-state” and global struggles between emigrants 
and “stay-at-homes” over narratives of national identity. The debate over 
IOs is thus a manifestation of glocalization—the simultaneous pressures 
exerted by local and global tendencies. 
Central to the debate are two different systems for IOs—the sui 
generis system of AOOs and the like promoted by IO advocates like the 
European Union (the EU) (generally civil law jurisdictions) and the system 
promoted by IO skeptics like the United States (the US) (generally 
common law jurisdictions) under which IOs are subsumed within a pre-
existing trademark system. Although key international agreements dealing 
with IOs have sought to “bridge the gap” between the two systems by 
permitting signatories to protect IOs under either system, this article finds 
that there is an inherent, irreconcilable tension between the two systems, 
making the gap unbridgeable. The article concludes that it is in the interests 
of all that a sui generis and limited system of AOO protection tethered 
closely to the land be adopted within an international, harmonized 
framework. Indeed, this is the only practical normative basis on which 
AOOs can and should be based without doing undue harm to pre-existing 
trademark and common language rights. Further, it may well break the 
deadlock in negotiations between IO proponents and opponents. 
 
 2. Cf. Kal. Raustiala & Stephen R. Munzer, The Global Struggle over Geographic Indications, 
18 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 337 (2007); Burkhart Goebel & Manuela Groeschl, The Long Road to Resolving 
Conflicts between Trademarks and Geographical Indications, 104 TRADEMARK REP 829, at 830 
(2014); and Anselm Kamperman Sanders, Geographical Indications of Origin: When GIs Become 
Commodities, All Gloves Come Off, 46 IIC - INT. REV. INTELLECT. PROP. COMPET. L. 755, at 755 
(2015). 
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I.B: Structure of article and outline of arguments 
After clarifying some important definitional matters, I provide an 
overview of the current international agreements concerning IO protection 
in Part II. 
Part III outlines the “economic geography” of IO protection, noting in 
particular the, if not diametrically opposed, then certainly fragmented and 
fragmenting positions adopted and pushed by different countries (this is my 
first argument that there is deepening fragmentation in the international IO 
order). It also notes the historical/cultural, economic, and political 
underpinnings to those positions (this is my second argument that the 
fragmentation is not merely philosophical/systemic, but erupts from the 
widening hyphen between nation and state in “nation-state”). 
Part IV sets out my third argument that, upon proper scrutiny, the 
theoretical justifications for IOs and their closest cousin in the intellectual 
property family, trademarks, clash in a manner that is irreconcilable. In 
particular, the cognate key tenets of trademark law of distinctiveness and 
“genericide” cannot be reconciled with IO’s protection for place names and 
refusal to accept the consequences of “genericide”. “Genericide” refers to a 
trademark owner losing their exclusive rights because their trademark has 
become generic, i.e., becomes the commonly used sign for a good or 
service (e.g., “Kleenex”). 
In Part V, I set out my fourth argument that the theoretical 
justifications for IOs are not solely to be found in traditional theories of 
intellectual property, but also in a cultural heritage theory grounded in the 
protection, maintenance and sharing of cultural heritage. Thus, irrespective 
of whether or not an IO becomes a common descriptive term or could be 
used in an arbitrary or fancy fashion that would not cause consumer 
confusion, it should be reserved for the current occupants of the particular 
place whose name forms the IO. This is subject to the proviso that the IO 
retain an intimate connection to its indicated land. After all, an IO is not 
alienable in the sense that a trademark is. For example, a trademark may 
pass hands from a producer in the US to a producer in the Philippines, as 
may production of the good to which the trademark is attached. However, 
an IO is (or should be, I contend) tethered to the land—like an easement, it 
should “run with the land”. “Tethered to the land” refers to the extent to 
which the IO evokes a particular geographical location. 
This leads me to conclude in Part VI that the best path forward is for 
an international agreement to be signed (or a pre-existing agreement 
amended) requiring member countries to provide sui generis AOO 
protection for goods whose qualities are indeed “essentially [i.e., 
  
214 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 16:210 
necessarily, inextricably] attributable”3 to their geographical origin by 
requiring them to be, or to use, raw materials from that origin and, if made 
from raw materials, so made using local knowledge. By contrast, 
trademark-based GIs ought to be allowed to wither on the vine. 
I.C: Definitional matters 
GIs and AOOs – clarifying the distinction 
Due in no small part to the contest over the proper contents of GIs and 
AOOs, there is much confusion in the literature concerning their 
definitional boundaries, and delineating the distinction between the two can 
be elusive. For example, one commentator seeks to distinguish GIs from 
AOOs on the basis that “[w]hile geographical indications typically obtain 
their name from their geographical location. . .appellations of origin derive 
their special qualities from the geographical environment where the good 
is produced”.4 The practical effect of the distinction between “geographical 
location” and “geographical environment” is not immediately apparent – 
the names of both are generally the same or, at least, the indications for 
both are geographical names (and it is only the name that a GI/AOO 
protects, not the underlying knowledge, technology, terrestrial features, 
etc.). Nonetheless, the distinction does seek to grasp at the root of the 
matter – the degree of intimacy between the name/indication and the land. 
As the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) states, “[t]he 
basic difference between the two concepts is that the link with the place of 
origin must be stronger in the case of an appellation of origin.”5 
Bernard O’Connor helpfully elucidates the concept of IOs as follows: 
in contrast to a trademark, “[a] geographical indication is linked. . .to 
something more than mere human creativity including topography, climate 
or other factors independent from human creativity. Therefore, the link 
between the product and its geographical origin cannot be broken and no 
delocalization of production is possible. . .whereas trademarks put 
emphasis on the producer of a product, a geographical indication 
 
 3. WORLD TRADE ORG., AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS (signed on April 15, 1994), at art. 22(1), http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1996/TS0010.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2016) (emphasis added). 
 4. Danielle Dudding, The Lisbon Agreement: Why the United States Should Stop Fighting the 
Geneva Act, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 167, at 172 (2015). 
 5. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., Frequently Asked Questions: Geographical Indications, 
http://www.wipo.int/geo_indications/en/faq_geographicalindications.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). 
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underlines the geographical origin of a good and the characteristics that 
are derived therefrom.”6 
Herein, unless otherwise indicated, I define GIs consistently with the 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property agreement (TRIPS) as: 
“indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a 
Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, 
reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to 
its geographical origin.”7 However, I define an AOO consistently with the 
definition in the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of 
Origin and their International Registration (as amended on September 28, 
1979) (Lisbon Agreement) as: “the geographical denomination of a 
country, region, or locality, which serves to designate a product 
originating therein, the quality or characteristics of which are due 
exclusively or essentially to the geographical environment, including 
natural and human factors.”8 To further clarify the distinction between GIs 
and AOOs, I specify that (i) a GI may or may not be toponymic and may be 
registered under a trademark or a sui generis registration system; and (ii) an 
AOO is toponymic and is registered under a sui generis registration system. 
An example of a GI is “feta”. The etymology of “feta” lies in “fetta”, 
being the Italian for “slice”, which, in turn, stems from the Latin “offa”, 
meaning “morsel” or “piece”.9 Therefore, it is not a toponym, but derives 
from an everyday word. Nonetheless, it bears a historical association with a 
particular region (Greece) that produces white cheese using specific 
ingredients according to a particular process.10 An example of an AOO is 
“Champagne”, which is a sparkling wine from the Champagne region of 
France using grapes grown in that region.11 
The exceptions to using “GI” and “AOO” as defined above are: 
Part VI, wherein I argue for a more restrictive definition of AOO and, 
where I use “GI” or “AOO” in the context of a particular agreement, I 
 
 6. BERNARD O’CONNOR, THE LAW OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, at 113 (2004). Note: in this 
quote, “geographical indication” may be understood as equivalent in meaning to “IO” as used in this 
article. 
 7. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 3 (TRIPS), at art. 22(1).  
 8. Note: As will become apparent from the discussion below, in particular, Part VI wherein I set 
out my proposed definition of an AOO, I consider it doubtful that the geographical denomination of a 
country should form an AOO. Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity, I use this established definition of an 
AOO from the Lisbon Agreement as my starting point. 
 9. Douglas Harper, fetta (n.), ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, 
http://etymonline.com/index.php?term=fetta&allowed_in_frame=0 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). 
 10. See Bernard O’Connor & Irina Kireeva, What’s in a Name? The “Feta” Cheese Saga, 9 INT. 
TRADE L. REGUL. 110, at 110, 116-17 (2003). 
 11. See Daniel J. Gervais, Irreconcilable Differences? The Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement 
and the Common Law, 53 HOUST. L. REV. 339, at 342 n.7 (2015). 
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intend for those acronyms to have the meanings they are given in that 
agreement. To avoid confusion, rather than using “GI” as “an umbrella 
term whose overall purpose is to distinguish the identification of a 
product’s origin and its link with particular characteristics related to that 
origin,”12 I use the neologism “indicium originis” or “indication of origin” 
or “IO” to denote the “family” within which the “species” of GIs and 
AOOs fall. 
Trademarks 
I define a trademark quite simply as a sign used in the course of trade 
to distinguish one person’s goods and/or services from that of another.13 
PART II: INTERNATIONAL IO AGREEMENTS – A STORY OF 
FRAGMENTATION 
II.A: Early agreements 
The history of international indicium originis law reveals a pattern of 
increased protection for indications of origin, alongside increased 
confusion concerning the ontological nature of these indications. 
The first mention of subject matter akin to indicia originis in a 
multilateral treaty was the watershed Paris Convention on Industrial 
Property (Paris Convention) (1883).14 While the Paris Convention 
mentioned “indication of source” (“indication de provenance”), the term 
was left undefined, and only limited protection against false indications of 
source was provided for. 15 The Paris Convention’s protection against false 
indications of source has been expanded somewhat since 1883. Thus, the 
current incarnation of the Paris Convention (as amended in 1979) includes 
protection against “direct or indirect use of a false indication of the source 
of the goods or the identity of the producer, manufacturer, or merchant.”16 
 
 12. Daniele Giovannucci, Tim Josling, William Kerr, Bernard O'Connor & May T. Yeung, GUIDE 
TO GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS: LINKING PRODUCTS AND THEIR ORIGINS, at xiii (2009). 
 13. Compare WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 3 (TRIPS), at art. 15(1). 
 14. MICHAEL BLAKENEY, THE PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, at 10 (2014); 
Raustiala and Munzer, supra note 2, at 344. 
 15. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., CONVENTION DE PARIS POUR LA PROTECTION DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ 
INDUSTRIELLE (DU 20 MARS 1883) [PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL 
PROPERTY (OF MARCH 20, 1883)], at art. 10, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=287780 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). 
 16. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL 
PROPERTY (AS AMENDED ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1979), at arts. 9 and 10(1), 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=287556 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016); Raustiala 
and Munzer, supra note 2, at 344; MICHAEL BLAKENEY, supra note 11, at 344. 
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Increased protection for indications of origin came in the form of the 
Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of 
Source on Goods (1891) (Madrid Agreement), under which parties agree 
to prohibit the importation of “[a]ll goods bearing a false or deceptive 
indication by which one of the countries to which this Agreement applies, 
or a place situated therein, is directly or indirectly indicated as being the 
country or place of origin.”17 Of note was art. 4 on genericide of 
indications of origin, which allowed the courts of member countries to 
determine what appellations, on account of their generic character, fall 
outside the agreement. “[R]egional appellations concerning the source of 
products of the vine” were, however, carved out from art. 4. In a harbinger 
of future IO disputes, this carve-out was apparently the reason why major 
trading nations (the US, Germany and Italy) did not accede to the Madrid 
Agreement.18 
II.B: Lisbon Agreement and Geneva Act 
The Lisbon Agreement provides stronger protection for indications of 
origin than any other multilateral treaty.19 The agreement obliges its 
members, who form the Lisbon Union,20 to protect in their territories “the 
appellations of origin of products” of signatory countries, “recognized and 
protected as such in the country of origin” and registered at the 
International Bureau of WIPO.21 Foreshadowing the heightened protection 
for wine and spirit IOs under TRIPS,22 the Lisbon Agreement requires that 
protection be ensured “against any usurpation or imitation, even if the true 
origin of the product is indicated or if the appellation is used in translated 
form or accompanied by terms such as “kind,” “type,” “make,” 
“imitation”, or the like.”23 
No common law jurisdiction (apart from Israel) has acceded to the 
Lisbon Agreement, which only has 28 contracting parties.24 The Geneva 
 
 17. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., ARRANGEMENT DE MADRID CONCERNANT LA RÉPRESSION DES 
FAUSSES INDICATIONS DE PROVENANCE SUR LES MARCHANDISES (1891) [MADRID AGREEMENT FOR THE 
REPRESSION OF FALSE OR DECEPTIVE INDICATIONS OF SOURCE ON GOODS (1891)], at art. 1, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=281783 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). 
 18. BLAKENEY, supra note 14, at 12. 
 19. Dudding, supra note 4, at 182. 
 20. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., LISBON AGREEMENT FOR THE PROTECTION OF APPELLATIONS OF 
ORIGIN AND THEIR INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION (AS AMENDED ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1979), at 
art. 1(1), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=285838 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). 
 21. Id. at art. 1(2). 
 22. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 3 (TRIPS), at art. 23. 
 23. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 20 (Lisbon Agreement), at art. 3. 
 24. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., WIPO-Administered Treaties, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=10 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). As 
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Act of the Lisbon Agreement on Appellations of Origin and Geographical 
Indications (as adopted on May 20, 2015) (Geneva Act) emerged from a 
review of the Lisbon system with a view to making it more attractive to 
users and potential new members.25 However, if the intent of the Geneva 
Act was to make the Lisbon system palatable to countries that protect 
indications of origin under a trademark system, rather than sui generis 
system of AOO protection, it appears that the intent has not been realized.26 
At least two fundamental elements of a trademark-based system for 
indications of origin raise issues in terms of compatibility with the Geneva 
Act. These are, first, the “use” doctrine (a trademark owner only has rights 
over a sign for the goods/services in respect of which they use the sign, and 
may lose exclusive rights to the trademark in respect of some or all of those 
goods/services if they abandon it or acquiesce in another’s use for a 
sufficient length of time) and, second, the cognate doctrine of genericide. 
Standing in marked tension with the use doctrine, art. 11 of the 
Geneva Act replaces the right against usurpation of the Lisbon Agreement 
with a “TRIPS Plus” three-limbed right that members are required to 
furnish, namely the right to prevent: 
(a) use of an AOO or GI (as defined in the Geneva Act at art. 2(1)(i) 
and art. 2(1)(ii), respectively):27 
(i) in respect of goods of the same kind as those to which the 
AOO or GI applies; or 
 
of December 3, 2016 the contracting parties to the Lisbon Agreement are: Algeria, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, France, Gabon, Georgia, Haiti, Hungary, Iran, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Montenegro, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Slovakia, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Togo, and Tunisia. 
 25. Int'l Trademark Ass'n, New Act of the Lisbon Agreement Encompasses All Geographical 
Indications, Allows Accession by Regional Organizations, 70 INTA BULL. 11 (June 15, 2015), 
http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/LisbonAgreement_7011.aspx (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). 
 26. Cf. Gervais, supra note 11; Int'l Trademark Ass'n, supra note 25. 
 27. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., GENEVA ACT OF THE LISBON AGREEMENT ON APPELLATIONS OF 
ORIGIN AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS (adopted on May 20, 2015), at arts. 2(1)(i) and 2(1)(ii), 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=370115 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). The full 
text of these articles is: “This Act applies in respect of: 
(i) any denomination protected in the Contracting Party of Origin consisting of or 
containing the name of a geographical area, or another denomination known as referring 
to such area, which serves to designate a good as originating in that geographical area, 
where the quality or characteristics of the good are due exclusively or essentially to the 
geographical environment, including natural and human factors, and which has given the 
good its reputation; [AOO] as well as 
(ii) any indication protected in the Contracting Party of Origin consisting of or containing 
the name of a geographical area, or another indication known as referring to such area, 
which identifies a good as originating in that geographical area, where a given quality, 
reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its 
geographical origin. [GI]”. 
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(ii) in respect of goods or services not of the same kind as those 
to which the AOO or GI applies, if such use would suggest 
a connection with the AOO or GI beneficiaries and be likely 
to damage their interests, or, “where applicable”, if the use 
would be “likely to impair or dilute in an unfair manner, or 
take unfair advantage of” the GI’s reputation, 
in both cases, even if the AOO or GI is used in translated form or 
is accompanied by terms such as “style”, “kind”, “type”, “make”, 
“imitation”, “method”, “as produced in”, “like”, “similar”; and 
(b) “any other practice liable to mislead consumers as to the true 
origin, provenance or nature of the goods.” 
The Geneva Act has thereby secured the indication of origin 
protection that the pro-IO countries have been unable to agree through the 
TRIPS council at the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see discussion in 
Part II.C below). As Daniel Gervais writes, “the Geneva Act is a de facto 
expansion by (and for) the Lisbon Members of GI protection to goods other 
than wines and spirits—a measure sought by many WTO Members, 
especially in the developing world.”28 
It is not possible to reconcile art. 12 of the Geneva Act with the 
doctrine of genericide in trademark law. This doctrine is premised on the 
belief that, once a trademark has become generic, it is part of the commons, 
free for all to use like any dictionary word. However, art. 12 prevents a 
party from considering a registered AOO or GI as having become generic 
as long as it remains protected in the country of origin. As Gervais has 
explained,29 this is an extraordinary manifestation of lex originis in 
international intellectual property law, where a key governing principle is 
that of territoriality (i.e., substantive rights are national in nature).30 
In addition to expanding the level of protection enjoyed by indicia 
originis, the Geneva Act has expanded the protected subject matter by 
expanding the definition of “AOO”. This is part of the act’s attempt to 
“bridge the gap” between GIs and AOOs.31 Under the new definition, an 
AOO, just like a GI, does not necessarily need to incorporate a toponym, 
but could be a “denomination known as referring to [the relevant] area.”32 
 
 28. Gervais, supra note 11, at 349. 
 29. Id. at 352–54. 
 30. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of The International Intellectual Property System, 77 
CHI-KENT L. REV. 993, at 996-99 (2002). 
 31. See, generally, Gervais, supra note 11, at 340; Int'l Trademark Ass'n, supra note 25; Dudding, 
supra note 4, at 178. 
 32. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 27 (Geneva Act), see art. 1(vi) read together with art. 
2(1)(i) (emphasis added). 
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The only significant difference between AOOs and GIs under the Geneva 
Act thus appears to be: 
(a) a good designated by an AOO must have a quality or 
characteristics resulting from the geographical environment, 
including natural and human factors, in which that good 
originates, and which has given the good its reputation; whereas, 
(b) a good designated by a GI must have a quality, reputation or 
other characteristic resulting from its geographical origin.33 
This conflation of the definitions for two already confusingly 
overlapping concepts is retrograde. Not only does it introduce semantic 
confusion, but also it further “untethers” indicia originis from the land. As 
I argue in Part V, this is contrary to the theoretical justifications for this 
subject matter. Thus, while introducing the language of GIs may have the 
benefit of including terminology with which the New World postcolonial 
countries are familiar, this is very much an improvement of form and not 
one of substance. I therefore disagree with Gervais that this “dual 
approach” is an improvement;34 rather, it is markedly disadvantageous. 
It follows from the analysis above that the Geneva Act has sought to 
bring within the Lisbon system’s orbit trademark-based IO protection, 
apparently to encourage common law jurisdictions to join. However, in so 
doing, the Geneva Act has had the effect of broadening and strengthening 
the level of protection given to both AOOs and trademark-based GIs under 
the Lisbon system. This is because, although an AOO enjoyed more 
expansive rights under the Lisbon Agreement than a GI traditionally 
receives in trademark-based systems, as explained in Part I.C above, a GI is 
a broader concept than an AOO (e.g., while a GI may include a toponym, 
that was a necessary element of an AOO under the Lisbon Agreement). 
Thus, if the aim was to attract “New World” countries already chary of 
strengthening protection for indicia originis, strengthening the protection 
that indicia originis receive under the Lisbon system would appear to be an 
odd way of going about achieving that aim. 
II.C: TRIPS and the WTO 
The debate between the Old World European countries seeking strong 
indication of origin protection and New World postcolonial countries 
seeking to temper the strength of such protection is manifest in TRIPs. 
 
 33. Id. see arts. 1(vi), 1(vii), read together with art. 2(1). See the full text of arts. 2(1)(i) and 
2(1)(ii) at supra note 27. 
 34. Gervais, supra note 11, at 347–48. 
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Early in the Uruguay Round TRIPS negotiations, the EU sought 
strong protection for indications of origin, including that all GIs be 
protected against any usurpation, imitation or evocation, even where 
accompanied by expressions such as “kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation” or 
the like, and requiring refusal or invalidation of any application or 
registration for a trademark containing “a geographical or other indication 
denominating or suggesting a country, region or locality with respect to 
goods not having this origin.”35 
By contrast, the US draft text granted very sparse protection to GIs 
and under a trademark-based, rather than more stringent sui generis, 
system. It simply obliged parties to protect GIs that certify regional origin 
by providing for their registration as certification or collective marks, and 
also to protect non-generic appellations for wine.36 
As is often the case with major negotiations, things that fall into the 
“too hard” basket are left to be dealt with at a later time. The Uruguay 
Round negotiations resulted in WTO members being required to protect 
indications of origin, but having discretion as to the system of protection 
and only having to protect a subset of such indications, denoting wines and 
spirits, against imitation even where the true origin is indicated or where 
accompanied by expressions such as “kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation” or 
the like.37 Article 24 of TRIPS obliges members to enter into negotiations 
aimed at increasing the level of protection of GIs under art. 23 (Additional 
Protection for Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits). 
Since the signing of TRIPS, a deeply divided debate has taken place 
within the TRIPS Council between IO advocates seeking to extend the 
higher level of protection afforded IOs for wines and spirits and those who 
oppose the extension. Proponents include the EU, Guinea, India, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia and Turkey, who wish to use the higher 
level of protection to improve marketing of their products. Opponents 
include Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, New Zealand, 
Panama, Paraguay, the Philippines, Chinese Taipei and the US, who stress 
 
 35. European Communities, Draft Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, at arts. 19 to 21 (March 29, 1990), 
http://www.tripsagreement.net/documents/GATTdocs/Draft_Agreement_on_Trade_Related_Aspects_o
f_IP_Rights_E_E.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). 
 36. United States, Draft Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
at arts. 18 and 19 (May 11, 1990), 
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/mtn.gng_.ng11.w.70_11may1990_us_draft_trips.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2016). 
 37. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 3 (TRIPS), at arts. 22 and 23. 
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the view that migrants should not be penalized for having taken names and 
methods of making products from their homeland and using them in good 
faith.38 
The inability of IO advocates to seek increased protection for all IOs 
through the TRIPS Council process may at least in part explain the efforts 
to secure higher protection for IOs through the Geneva Act (described in 
Part II.B above). This process of securing protection outside of the broad 
multilateral framework of the WTO is evidence of fragmentation in the 
field of IOs. Gervais suggests that, notwithstanding the deep philosophical 
divide between IO advocates and opponents, the practical effect of 
exogenous pressures (namely, the benefit of access to European markets 
that New World countries may gain in return for concessions on IO 
protection) may lead to acceptance of the higher level of protection for IOs 
of the kind provided in the Geneva Act.39 One way of testing this view, as 
well as my argument of increased fragmentation, is by considering how the 
recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) deals with IOs. 
II.D: TPP 
The TPP (signed on February 4, 2016) is a multilateral trade 
agreement between 12 Pacific Rim countries that has the overall effect of 
requiring signatories to increase intellectual property protection. Five of its 
signatories are against higher IO protection (Australia, Canada, Chile, New 
Zealand, and the US) and two are members of the Lisbon Agreement 
(Mexico, Peru). 
The TPP defines a GI in substantively the same terms as TRIPS.40 Key 
relevant features of the TPP are: 
(a) it allows parties to protect GIs through trademark, sui generis or 
other legal means (art. 18.30); 
(b) it requires any administrative procedures to be transparent and 
without imposition of overly burdensome formalities (art. 18.31); 
(c) it requires parties to allow interested persons to oppose/cancel the 
GI on the grounds that, in the territory of the party (not of the 
origin of the GI good) the GI is: 
 
 38. WORLD TRADE ORG., TRIPS: Geographical Indications - Background and the current 
situation (2016), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/gi_background_e.htm#protection (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2016); see also Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon-the Spirited Debate 
About Geographical Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299, at 320–31 (2006); and Gervais, supra note 11. 
 39. Gervais, supra note 11, at 340, 346, 368-71. 
 40. TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (signed on February 4, 2016), at art. 18.1 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Intellectual-Property.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). 
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(i) likely to cause confusion with a trademark that is the subject 
of a pre-existing good faith pending application or 
registration; 
(ii) likely to cause confusion with a pre-existing trademark; or 
(iii) a term customary in common language as the common 
name for the relevant good (art. 18.32.1); 
(d) if a party protects or recognizes a GI pursuant to another 
international agreement, it must, among other things, provide that 
the above grounds of opposition/cancellation be available in 
respect of that GI (art. 18.36.1), unless the GI was specifically 
identified in, and recognized/protected pursuant to, an 
international agreement concluded before the TPP (art. 18.36.6); 
and 
(e) the above requirements in general do not apply to GIs for wine 
and spirits (see, e.g., art. 18.32, fn. 21; art. 18.36.4, but see also 
art. 18.32.1(c), fn. 21, being a carve-out for customary names of 
a grape variety existing in the territory of a party).41 
It is apparent from the above analysis that, while the EU and other IO 
proponents have sought elevated protection for indications of origin via the 
Geneva Act, the US and other IO opponents have sought to reinforce the 
principles of a trademark-based system under the TPP. This system is 
founded on the doctrines of capacity to distinguish (and avoid consumer 
confusion), first-in-time priority to a trademark and genericide. While 
negotiations within the broad multilateral framework of the TRIPS Council 
have stalled, pro- and anti-IO forces have pursued their interests in other 
plurilateral and regional fora, leading to a marked fragmentation in 
international IO law. This would tend to undermine Gervais’s postulation 
that “trade bricks” could form the stuff of a bridge between the pro- and 
anti-IO camps.42 The overview of the “economic geography” of IOs in 
Part III provides further evidence of fragmentation. 
PART III: THE ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF IOS – FURTHER 
FRAGMENTATION 
III.A: Political economy of IOs 
As Kal Raustiala and Stephen Munzer have persuasively argued, the 
increasingly persistent efforts to cement indicia originis in international 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Gervais, supra note 11, at 340, 346, 368-71. 
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law may be attributed to: (i) falling trade barriers that have lowered the 
prices of IO protected goods and engendered a global market for previously 
local, discrete markets; (ii) goods similar to IO protected goods existing in 
many states due to prior waves of immigration, which brought skills and 
tastes to new locations, and these goods now competing with their 
“original” forebears on global markets; and (iii) rising wealth and falling 
food prices increasing the share of household income available for niche 
food products, often marketed under IOs.43 IOs therefore exemplify the 
process of “glocalization”, or “the simultaneity—the co-presence—of both 
universalizing and particularizing tendencies.”44 For IOs, protection of the 
local product is important to expanding global markets for that product.45 
In other words, global markets value IO products because of their local 
characteristics, quality or reputation owing to their geographical 
provenance, i.e., their authenticity. 
III.B: Potential economic value of IOs 
To put it crudely, IOs can now mean big bucks for rural regions in 
Europe (and other locations whose names have become so bound up with 
goods made there that inhabitants can trade off the name). By way of 
illustration, in France, the average price of IO protected cheeses (€10.42 
per kg) is 30 percent higher than that of non-IO cheeses (€8.11 per kg).46 
Further, in France, over the period of 1997-2001, total revenue from IO 
products increased by 6.8 percent per annum, compared with corresponding 
per annum growth rates of 0.7 percent, 3.7 percent and 4.2 percent for the 
farming sector, food industry overall, and Gross National Product, 
respectively (see Figure 1).47 
 
 
 43. Raustiala and Munzer, supra note 2, at 347. 
 44. Roland Robertson, Comments on the “Global Triad” and “Glocalization” (1997), 
http://www2.kokugakuin.ac.jp/ijcc/wp/global/15robertson.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). 
 45. Giovannucci et al., supra note 12, at xvii. 
 46. Id. at 29. 
 47. Id. at 30. Figure 1 is a reproduction of Figure 2.4 in Giovannucci et al., supra note 12 at 30. It 
has been reproduced with permission from the International Trade Centre, Geneva, Switzerland. The 
full content of Giovannucci et al., supra note 12 is available at www.intracen.org/publications. 
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FIGURE 1: Selected economic growth rates, France, 1997-2001 
 
The monetary value of IOs is not limited to France. In Vietnam, 
following the provision of IO protection for Phu Quoc Fish Sauce (Phu 
Quoc is an island in southwest Vietnam), its domestic price reportedly rose 
from approximately €0.50 to €1.50 per liter.48 In China, my own research 
indicates that the average price for West Lake Longjing (a green tea from 
West Lake district, Zhejiang that has enjoyed IO protection since 2001)49 at 
three randomly selected teashops in Beijing is 1,867RMB per 500g 
compared with 433RMB per 500g for Longjing from outside West Lake 
district.50 It bears mentioning that all three above jurisdictions protect IOs 
under a sui generis system (with China using both sui generis and 
trademark systems). It would be interesting to compare whether or not 
there is a significant difference between the values of IOs protected under 
trademark-based systems as compared with sui generis systems, but that is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
III.C: Approaches to protecting IOs 
As was shown in Part II, the social, cultural and economic pressures 
exerted by “glocalization” have not resulted in a harmonious approach to 
international IO agreements. Indeed, fragmentation in IO protection stems 
in no small part from inter-country systemic differences. 
 
 48. Id. at 28-29. 
 49. Id. at 29. 
 50. Benjamin Hopper, Fieldwork Notes for Masters Thesis at Harvard Law School, on file with 
author. 
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Countries can be divided into those, generally Old World/civil law, 
jurisdictions with a sui generis system under which unique and specific 
protection is provided for IOs (i.e., they are not “subsumed” within a pre-
existing intellectual property regime) and those, generally New 
World/common law, jurisdictions that protect IOs under the pre-existing 
trademark regime, generally as certification trademarks51 or collective 
trademarks.52 Sui generis system countries tend to rely quite heavily on the 
concept of terroir: the idea that “a particular land is a key input for a 
particular product.”53 By way of illustration, the European Commission 
drew on the concept of terroir in a 2005 IO food media campaign, 
describing “le goût du terroir” (i.e., “the taste of the terroir”) as “a distinct, 
identifiable taste reminiscent of a place, region or locality . . . Foods and 
beverages that evoke the term terroir have signature qualities that link 
their taste to a specific soil with particular climate conditions. Only the 
land, climate and expertise of the local people can produce the product that 
lives up to its name.”54 
The key distinctions between a sui generis IO approach and a 
trademark approach are summarized in Table 1 below.55 
 
Feature Trademark approach Sui generis approach 
Ownership Anyone. Typically individual 
entity or corporation, 
sometimes collective or 
government 
Producers or government 
Alienability Yes Linked to origin. Cannot be 
delocalized 
Rights to name First in time Distinguishes legitimate 
rights to origin, irrespective of 
time of application 
Protection Private. Burden primarily on 
owner to enforce 
Public. Burden primarily on 
government to enforce 
Use Necessary to maintenance Collective, open to all 
producers who comply with 
rules 
 
 51. A certification mark is a mark registered by an entity that does not use the mark, but is 
authorized to certify that goods or services used in connection with the mark meet a certain standard, 
including having a particular place of origin, material and/or method of manufacture. 
 52. A collective mark is a mark used by members of an association to distinguish their goods or 
services from the goods or services of persons who are not members of the association. 
 53. Hughes, supra note 35, at 301. 
 54. Cited in Raustiala and Munzer, supra note 2, at 344.  
 55. Adapted from Giovannucci et al., supra note 12, at 55. 
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Feature Trademark approach Sui generis approach 
Quality Not specified, except for 
some certification marks 
Disclosed in standards or 
specifications obligatorily 
linked to origin 
Name or sign May be created and may or 
may not include geographic 
name 
Must exist already and must 
link to terroir 
TABLE 1: Trademark and sui generis approaches to IOs 
 
Common law jurisdictions tend to prefer the trademark, private rights 
based approach to protecting IOs, while civil law jurisdictions tend to 
prefer the sui generis approach, under which IOs are inalienable 
community assets that cannot be decoupled from their origin.56 This is 
illustrated by the map in Figure 2. The map shows that countries with a 
trademark approach to IOs tend to be common law jurisdictions and former 
colonies of the United Kingdom. One hundred and eleven countries use a 
sui generis system, while 56 countries use a trademark system.57 
 
 
FIGURE 2: IO protection for agri-food products58 
 
 56. Id. at 55. 
 57. Id. at 124. 
 58. Id. at 50. Figure 2 is a reproduction of Figure 4.1 in Giovannucci et al., supra note 12, at 50. It 
has been reproduced with permission from the International Trade Centre, Geneva, Switzerland. The 
full content of Giovannucci et al., supra note 12 is available at www.intracen.org/publications. 
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Within these countries, there is a variety of mechanisms by which IO 
protection is provided, adding to the global fragmentation of the concept of 
IOs. These differences feed into differences of approach within the 
international IO order. While many countries agree there would be benefits 
to having a common international registration system, they differ on how 
such a system should be structured.59 
III.D: The nation-state and IOs 
The fragmentation described above does not only flow from 
philosophical, systemic and economic factors. Borrowing from Arjun 
Appadurai’s postcolonial analysis of disjuncture and difference in the 
global cultural economy,60 the heated debate over IOs may be understood 
as stemming from the widening “hyphen” between nation and state in 
“nation-state”—61a hyphen being stretched ever further with the movement 
of peoples (i.e., nations) away from states in increasingly disparate 
directions. By way of illustration, the fame of “feta” spread with the large-
scale emigration of Greeks. These emigrants made “feta” from cow’s milk 
due to low supplies of traditional “feta” (made with sheep’s and goat’s 
milk). They continued to use the word “feta” due to its existing 
reputation.62 Thus, the New World approach to IOs may be understood as 
part of an “ethnoscape” (the global, not necessarily contiguous, spaces 
inhabited by communities of persons who may share “imagined worlds”)63 
of people who have migrated away from the IO territory but retained its 
culture, including names for particular goods from that territory. This 
represents the “nation” fighting against the “state”, manifest in the Old 
World approach to IOs, whose states seek to maintain control over cultural 
products originating in their territories. The value of IOs to the consumer 
may be understood as a form of “production fetishism” —the fetish for 
authentic locally produced goods (often an illusion in a global economy 
marked by transnational production loci).64 Thus, the disjuncture between 
nation and state is central to the global cultural flows of IOs. 
 
 59. Id. at 41. 
 60. Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy, 2 PUBLIC 
CULT., Vol. 2, No. 2, 11(1990). 
 61. Id. at 13-14. 
 62. O’Connor and Kireeva, supra note 10, at 117. 
 63. Id. at 7. 
 64. Id. at 16. 
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When understood in this light, the protracted and, thus far, fruitless 
negotiations concerning IOs at the TRIPS Council and the divergent 
approaches being taken by the likes of the EU and the US in various trade 
agreements, begin to make sense. Can a normative justification for a 
specific form of IO be found that might bridge the gap between migrant-
receiving states (that favor a trademark approach) and migrant-sending 
states (that favor a sui generis approach)? I now turn to this fundamental 
and, I contend, hitherto unresolved question. 
PART IV: DOCTRINAL AND CONCEPTUAL TENSIONS 
IV.A: Doctrinal and conceptual tensions 
It may be regarded as remarkable that IOs have sought to be protected 
as trademarks given what appear to be irreconcilable tensions between the 
conceptual and theoretical underpinnings for IOs and trademarks. In this 
part, I argue that, upon proper scrutiny, IOs and their closest cousin in the 
intellectual property family, trademarks, clash irreconcilably. In particular, 
the cognate key tenets of trademark doctrine of capacity to distinguish and 
“genericide” cannot be reconciled with IO’s protection for place names and 
refusal to accept the consequences of “genericide”. 
IV.B: Doctrinal and conceptual tension between IOs and trademarks 
It is a fundamental tenet of trademark law that, to be registrable, a 
trademark must be distinctive. This means that, on the grounds of public 
policy, one trader “ought not to be allowed to obtain by registration under 
the Trade Marks Act a monopoly in what other traders may legitimately 
desire to use.”65 Words forming part of the common language should be 
free to all to use in the course of their business and no one person should be 
able to claim exclusive rights to dictionary words. Thus, the question of 
distinctiveness largely depends on “whether other traders are likely, in the 
ordinary course of their business and without any improper motive, to 
desire to use the same mark, or some mark nearly resembling it, upon or in 
connection with their own goods.”66 
It follows that “no person should be able to monopolise a place name, 
because the effect of registration would be to impose an unreasonable 
restraint upon other traders who may legitimately wish to use that name in 
 
 65. Smith, Kline and French Laboratories Ltd v Sterling-Winthrop Group Ltd, [1976] RPC 511, at 
538–39. 
 66. W & G Du Cros Ltd’s Application, (1913) 30 RPC 660, at 672. 
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relation to their own goods or services.”67 The only exception to this is 
where the use of a place name does not carry the signification of the place. 
This may arise in two circumstances: (i) the place name used in respect of 
the specified goods or services does not connote the place because it is an 
arbitrary/fanciful usage (e.g., AMAZON (a vast rainforest in South 
America) for an online store);68 and (ii) the place name has acquired 
distinctiveness or secondary meaning, such that its use in respect of 
specified goods or services no longer denotes a geographical location, but 
rather, it denotes a particular trader and/or a particular quality or “brand” 
associated with a good or service (e.g., the word COLUMBIA (the name 
of, among other things, the largest river in the Pacific Northwest region of 
North America)69 used in respect of sportswear has come to be associated, 
at least in the US, with the sportswear company originally named for the 
river near where the company was founded).70 
The underlying reasoning has been explained as follows: “if goods of 
the kind in question are produced at the particular place or in the area, or 
if it is reasonable to suppose that such goods in the future will be produced 
there, other traders have a legitimate interest in using the geographical 
name to identify their goods, and it is this interest which is not to be 
supplanted by permitting any one trader to effect trade mark 
registration.”71 
In stark contrast, the very purpose of an IO (be it a GI or an AOO) is 
to signify that the good in respect of which it is used comes from the 
indicated place. Thus, if an indicium originis functions as intended to 
signify a place where goods of the kind in question are produced, then it 
should absolutely not be registered as a trademark. The counter-position 
from a pro-IO enthusiast might be that, if a person wishes to produce goods 
of the kind in question at the place, then, provided certain stipulated criteria 
are complied with, that person may use the place name for their product. 
The rebuttal from the trademark perspective is threefold. First, the 
requirement that certain stipulated criteria be complied with infringes upon 
freedom of trade (i.e., freedom to manufacture as one wishes). Secondly, if 
the place name can be used in a manner that is distinctive (e.g., AMAZON 
 
 67. Re Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford T/A Oxford University Press 
v the Registrar of Trade Marks, (1990) 24 FCR 1, at 24. 
 68. J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (Fourth Edition, 
2016), at § 14:7. 
 69. WIKIPEDIA, Columbia River, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbia_River (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2016). 
 70. WIKIPEDIA, Columbia Sportswear, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbia_Sportswear (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2016). 
 71. Re Chancellor, supra note 67, at 41. 
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for an online store (inherent distinctiveness) or COLUMBIA for sportswear 
(acquired distinctiveness)), then it is unreasonable to restrain traders from 
using that name in good faith in that fashion. Thirdly, as explained further 
in Part IV.C below, if the place name has entered the common language as 
the name for the good, irrespective of where it is produced, no one person 
or association should have the monopoly over that term. The doctrinal 
tension between IOs and trademarks is irreconcilable. 
IV.C: Tension between GIs and AOOs 
As signalled above, a tension persists between a “pure” form of IOs, 
represented by the sui generis approach of AOOs, and a trademark form of 
IOs, represented by GIs. A GI is subject to a form of GI genericide (“geo-
genericide”) well captured by art. 18.32 of the TPP (discussed in Part II.D 
above), namely, becoming “a term customary in common language as the 
common name for the relevant good.” However, even if an AOO enters the 
vernacular as the common reference for the referent good, on a pure IO 
approach, the exclusive right to that AOO should remain with the 
producers in the AOO region. 
For example, the word “feta” is commonly used to refer to salty, 
crumbly white cheese made from sheep’s and/or goat’s milk.72 Some might 
argue that, although it has retained a cultural affiliation with Greece, the 
word has become so commonly used that it no longer signifies such cheese 
originating in Greece, but cheese with the qualities just described 
irrespective of the locus of production. An AOO purist would nonetheless 
insist that that cultural affiliation with place be retained, even if it becomes 
very distant. A trademark lawyer, however, would say the word has entered 
the common language and to grant monopoly rights to its use is 
anathema.73 
Similarly, imagine that the word “Champagne” were to begin to 
signify something other than sparkling wine in the mind of the ordinary 
consumer. For example, through widespread colloquial usage it came to 
mean, “to gather for a soirée.” On a pure AOO approach, the consumer 
should be educated that the subsequent “slang” is inferior and subservient 
 
 72. See O’Connor and Kireeva, supra note 10, at 116-17. 
 73. Note: in 2005, the European Court of Justice confirmed the validity of the IO (specifically, the 
Protected Designation of Origin) for “feta”. See Federal Republic of Germany and Kingdom of 
Denmark v. Commission of the European Communities, E.C.R. (2005); WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
DEFINING A NAME’S ORIGIN: THE CASE OF FETA, 
http://www.wipo.int/ipadvantage/en/details.jsp?id=5578 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). 
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to the original place name designation for sparkling wine. On a trademark 
approach, this slang meaning should not be policed in any way. 
These distinct approaches to geo-genericide compound the doctrinal 
and conceptual irreconcilability between IOs and trademarks. The source of 
the tension, however, is not only to be found in doctrinal differences, but 
also in the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of each. These are 
examined in the next part of this article. 
PART V: ELICITING THE THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR IOS 
While the closest cousin of IOs are trademarks, the normative 
justifications of the two forms of mark are distinct and do not admit of 
merger. In this part, after identifying the functions of trademarks and IOs, I 
argue that the theoretical justifications for IOs do not lie solely in 
traditional theories of intellectual property (welfare, labor, personhood, and 
cultural theory), but also, and more significantly, are grounded in the 
protection, maintenance and sharing of cultural heritage. 
V.A: The functions and justifications of trademarks 
In a highly illuminating article, Lee Burgunder identifies three key 
functions of trademarks: 
(a) to enable consumers to discriminate efficiently among similar 
products in the marketplace with minimal private and social costs 
(Distinguishing Function); 
(b) to preserve the goodwill of traders (and, hence, foster incentives 
for traders to offer quality goods and services) (Goodwill 
Function); and 
(c) to allow consumers to associate goods or services in the 
marketplace with certain forms of information expressed in 
advertising (Advertising Function).74 
Burgunder stresses that these are “the only legitimate functions of 
trademarks.”75 But perhaps his point may be better put as follows: if a mark 
is not serving one of these functions, or another socially valuable function, 
then exclusive use of the mark should neither be recognized nor enforced. 
To the above functions of trademarks, I would add: 
(d) to encourage the development of signs that enrich culture through 
free participation in semiotic democracy, i.e., in “the process of 
 
 74. Lee B. Burgunder, An Economic Approach to Trademark Genericism, 23 AM. BUS. L.J. 391, 
at 396 (1985). 
 75. Id.. 
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making cultural meaning”76 or “the construction of [one’s] 
cultural environment” (Cultural Function);77 
(e) to promote social harmony through a system of registration that 
enables all persons in a society to know which trademarks belong 
to whom and which may be safely used without infringing on 
another’s rights (which would disturb the Goodwill Function) or 
causing consumer confusion (which would disturb the 
Distinguishing Function) (Social Harmony Function). 
A trademark will not serve a socially valuable function if that 
trademark per se constitutes a barrier to effective competition, in which 
case it should be cancelled.78 This happens where a trademark becomes a 
common descriptive name (e.g., a dictionary or “Urban Dictionary”79 term 
for something) and ceases to signify the trader or the trader’s “brand”. If 
this happens, maintenance of the registration for that trademark 
substantially reduces substitutability, not because of the association with a 
particular person (who has invested in goodwill and should therefore retain 
the benefit of that goodwill in the form of a trademark registration), but 
because it has become a common word that other traders may well desire to 
use in the course of trade without any improper motive. This may be 
because the mark has become the most convenient and efficient means of 
communicating information about those traders’ goods or services (e.g., it 
is much more convenient and efficient to say “feta” than to say “white, 
salty, crumbly cheese made from sheep and/or goat’s milk”). In short, if the 
trademark becomes a common descriptive term, it is not able to fulfill the 
above functions and loses its raison d’etre 
Traditional theories of intellectual property help to explicate a 
trademark system’s functions. These are: welfare theory (or utilitarianism), 
labor (or just desserts) theory, personhood (or personality) theory and 
cultural (or social planning) theory. Each theory is briefly explained in turn 
before applying them to the functions of trademarks identified above. 
 
 76. William W. Fisher III, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
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 77. WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF 
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 79. Courts are increasingly relying on Urban Dictionary in decision-making. See, e.g., Leslie 
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20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/business/media/urban-dictionary-finds-a-place-in-the-
courtroom.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). 
  
234 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 16:210 
Welfare theory (the principal theory applied to intellectual property)80 
notes that intellectual property comprises “public goods”, which include 
signs like IOs. These public goods share the attributes of being (i) non-
rivalrous (use of the good by one person does not prevent use of the good 
by other persons) and (ii) non-excludable (once the good has been made 
available to one person, it is difficult, if not impossible, to prevent others 
from gaining access to it). These attributes mean that, without some kind of 
government intervention to allow recoupment of the high costs of original 
production, such goods may not be produced in the first place. Welfare 
theory suggests that one means of dealing with this public goods problem is 
by granting government-backed exclusive rights (e.g., intellectual property 
rights) to those goods. This exclusivity is justified if, and to the extent that, 
its benefits to society outweigh its costs (i.e., Bentham’s “greatest good for 
the greatest number”).81 
Labor theory postulates that a person should acquire property rights in 
a thing resulting from mixing their labor with un-owned things or things 
held in common.82 This is subject to the proviso that, after acquiring the 
property rights, “there is enough and as good left in common for others.”83 
Under labor theory then, a person has a natural right to their artistic or 
scientific creations, subject to that right not breaching the proviso.84 
Personhood theory, derived from Kantian and Hegelian thought,85 
postulates that creators of things are entitled to considerable continuing 
control over their creations, where injuries to those creations injures the 
creator’s self, or control over those creations is part of a general project of 
creating and maintaining an identity.86 
Cultural theory postulates that intellectual property rights should be 
shaped so as to foster a just and attractive culture.87 As William Fisher 
explains, “[t]his approach is similar to utilitarianism in its teleological 
orientation, but dissimilar in its willingness to deploy visions of a desirable 
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 82. Robert Nozick, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA, at 174-182 (1999). 
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 84. Fisher, supra note 76, at 170-71. 
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 86. See Fisher, supra note 76; and Hughes, supra note 85. 
 87. For more comprehensive discussions of these theories, see the seminal Fisher, supra note 76; 
and (on labor and personhood theories) see Hughes, supra note 85. 
  
2016 WHITHER (WITHER?) GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS? 235 
society richer than the conceptions of ‘social welfare’ deployed by 
utilitarians.”88 
Applying these theories to the functions of trademarks identified 
above then, one can say: 
(a) welfare theory supports the trademark’s Distinguishing Function, 
as any losses associated with the exclusive rights to a particular, 
distinctive mark are outweighed by the benefit to society as a 
whole in reducing search costs and minimizing confusion; 
(b) labor theory seems most adapted to supporting the trademark’s 
Goodwill Function – traders’ investment in building the name of 
their goods or services ought to be rewarded with exclusive 
rights in order to incentivize ongoing consistent rendering of 
those goods or services. Personhood theory is also relevant, 
particularly where personal reputation is bound up in the 
goodwill attaching to a trademark; 
(c) welfare theory supports the trademark’s Advertising Function 
because of that function’s contribution to minimizing search 
costs; 
(d) labor and cultural theory support the trademark’s Cultural 
Function because adding to the “cultural stock” (with new signs) 
ought to be rewarded and it also tends to foster a just and 
attractive culture; and 
(e) welfare and cultural theory support the trademark’s Social 
Harmony Function because the order of formalities is necessary 
to the Distinguishing Function and is also necessary to avoid the 
semiotic confusion that would result in the absence of 
formalities, upsetting the Cultural Function. 
V.B: The functions and justifications of IOs 
The functions of IOs are similar to, but in significant respects distinct 
from, those of trademarks. More importantly for present purposes, the 
normative justifications for them do not reside solely in traditional theories 
of intellectual property. 
(a) IOs serve a Distinguishing Function, but do not distinguish a 
particular trader or “brand”; rather, they distinguish a particular 
product made in a particular place. The normative justification 
for this is not a welfare theory-based benefit of minimizing 
search costs; rather, it may be justified on the basis of recognition 
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of cultural heritage. Personhood theory lends support to this 
function, but only to the extent that the group’s personality is 
bound up in the land delimited by the IO and not to the extent 
that the personality is bound up in transportable knowledge used 
to make IO goods;89 
(b) IOs serve a Goodwill Function, but seek to preserve the goodwill 
of the community of IO good producers and not that of individual 
traders. As with trademarks, the normative justification for this 
lies in labor theory. What is rewarded is not the ancestors’ labor 
involved in originally creating the terroir-based product,90 but 
rather the current inhabitants’ maintenance of the tradition of 
making that product in a particular place, as well as their 
foregoing other potentially more lucrative opportunities that 
could be made of that place such as the development of large 
hotel, entertainment and/or residential complexes or the building 
of factories or offices;91 
(c) IOs serve an Advertising Function in the sense of acting as a 
mnemonic for information about the IO goods, but that 
information pertains to the good’s connection to a particular 
place (i.e., information that the IO good has a particular quality 
owing to its terrestrial provenance); 
(d) IOs serve a Cultural Function of a sort—not in the sense of 
adding new cultural stock; but rather in the sense of preserving 
cultural heritage linked to a particular place; and 
(e) IOs serve a Social Harmony Function. However, this is not 
justified on the basis of a first-to-use or first-to-file priority 
principle like trademarks; rather, it is justified on the basis that 
giving inhabitants of a place the exclusive right to use a place 
name (or place-evoking name) for a locally produced good is the 
best means of securing social harmony. 
The principal normative justifications for IOs then are to be found not 
solely in traditional theories of property,92 but rather in a combination of: 
(i) a cultural heritage theory, under which the preservation of cultural 
heritage is valued; (ii) labor theory, under which the sacrifice made to use 
the land in the interests of preserving cultural heritage is valued and (iii) 
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personhood theory, under which a group’s connection to their land is 
valued. On this view, irrespective of whether or not an IO becomes a 
common descriptive term or could be used in an arbitrary or fancy fashion 
that would not cause consumer confusion, it should be reserved for the 
current occupants of the particular place whose name forms the IO, 
provided it retains an intimate connection to its indicated land. Otherwise, 
the IO could not function as the elicited cultural heritage and labor theory 
justifications require. Further, the personhood theory justification for IOs 
provides a basis for an anti-dilution right in respect of IOs, i.e., a right to 
prevent use of IOs even in translated form or accompanied by terms such as 
“kind,” “type,” “make,” “imitation”, or the like.93 This is because such use 
by others may tend to do injury to the community’s and its members’ sense 
of connection to their land. 
The key point is that, the stronger the tie between the IO and the land, 
the more the grant of an exclusive IO right can be justified on the above 
grounds without doing harm to others’ trademarks and common language 
use rights. Conversely, the more untethered from the land the IO becomes 
(i.e., the weaker its capacity to evoke a particular geographical location), 
the less it is justified on the above grounds. It loses its raison d’être and is 
therefore less deserving of exclusive rights. In other words, to the extent 
that the IO is used in respect of knowledge that happens to come from a 
particular place, it should not be protected; it should only be protected to 
the extent it is used in respect of its connection with the land. This is 
consistent with Raustalia and Munzer’s finding that “the more human 
factors—which are moveable—matter, the weaker is the rationale for 
protecting a GI only in a specified region.”94 
If an IO is closely connected to a particular delimited geographic 
region, the argument that persons from outside that region should be 
prevented from using an IO signifying a product from that region’s soil 
gains significant force. This is because it is not possible for others to 
produce the same product, even using the same transportable know-how, 
on different soil. After all, this link to the soil lies at the core of IOs’ raison 
d’être. 
The desideratum of an intimate relationship with the land being a sine 
qua non of IO protection is reinforced by the following key difference 
between IOs and all other intellectual property rights. Whereas the 
“commons” for IOs (i.e., places) is limited—there are only so many places 
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in the world (or in the galaxy should production of a good move to a 
“terroir” in outer space); the commons for ideas that could form the basis 
for other forms of intellectual property, including trademarks, is virtually 
unlimited. A “loose” regime for IO protection could well result in an over-
proliferation of place names being unjustifiably reserved for exclusive use. 
PART VI: CONCLUSION – AOOS FOR ALL 
The reason IO proponents’ efforts to secure a global IO system have 
faltered is that they have demonstrably failed to link IOs to a consistent 
theoretical framework and have sought to expand IOs beyond the confines 
of what their theoretical justification allows. This expansion has led to IO 
laws, including the Geneva Act, that seek to cover subject matter not 
justified by IOs’ normative foundation. Consequently, these laws lack 
“internal morality” (in the sense used by Lon Fuller).95 By the same token, 
the US’s (and others’) efforts to “accommodate” IOs within a trademark 
framework is a far from ideal approach, given the irreconcilable tensions 
between IOs and trademarks identified in Part IV above. 
In an era marked by glocalization and disjuncture, from the above 
analysis it follows that a unitary, harmonious and multilateral AOO regime 
should be agreed to under which protection of the kind guaranteed in the 
Geneva Act (see Part II.B above) is given to the subject matter of AOOs, 
very strictly and narrowly defined by reference to their relationship to the 
land. The distinction between AOOs and GIs ought to be kept clear, with 
GIs simply being a term for a sign consisting of or containing a toponym 
(or other place reference) subject to the exact same regime as any other 
trademark, including the doctrines of distinctiveness and genericide. Under 
this approach, it would be impermissible, without the authority of the 
AOO-owner, to use or register under the trademark system a GI containing 
a registered AOO, unless the use of the AOO is incidental and would not 
connote any relationship with the goods protected by the AOO. This 
approach would serve to ensure that AOO and GI laws remain true to their 
normative justifications, as well as providing semantic and conceptual 
clarity (features sorely missing from the IO debate until now). 
Having concluded that an AOO should receive the strong protection 
afforded under the Geneva Act, but be narrowly defined, I propose the 
following definition. An AOO must: 
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(a) consist of or contain a place name, or be a name strongly 
connected with the referent place in the mind of the ordinary 
consumer in the jurisdiction wherein the place is located [in the 
lattermost case, the applicant would bear the burden of proving 
the strong connection, for example, by clear and convincing 
evidence that it evokes the place in the mind of the ordinary 
consumer]; and 
(b) designate goods that either (i) per se originate from a particular 
place, or (ii) are made from raw materials originating in a 
particular place and any processing of those raw materials occurs 
in that place using local knowledge. 
My definition of an AOO is consistent with the Lisbon Agreement’s 
definition: “the geographical denomination of a country, region, or 
locality, which serves to designate a product originating therein, the 
quality or characteristics of which are due exclusively or essentially to the 
geographical environment, including natural and human factors.” I do 
allow non-toponymic AOOs, but only where there is the requisite strong 
connection between the AOO and the referent place. Further, I add the 
requirement that the product consist of, or be made from, raw materials 
originating from the earth of the geographical environment encompassed 
by the geographical denomination and, if made from raw materials, be 
made using local knowledge. The “local materials” and “local knowledge” 
elements are necessary to ensure that only AOOs with an intimate 
connection to the indicated land are afforded protection. 
The justifications for this approach are grounded primarily in 
traditional trademark theory, labor theory, personhood theory and cultural 
heritage theory (and cultural theory more generally). If the stringent 
definition for AOOs set out above is applied, then it will be true that others, 
even transporting/planting the same raw materials to the “second-comer” 
region, will not be able to reproduce goods with quite the same quality or 
characteristics as the goods produced in the AOO-protected region, with 
the result that (i) using the same name for goods from a different place 
could genuinely lead to consumer confusion and/or harm to the IO name 
(e.g., a consumer tastes a different-tasting good from the second-comer 
region and is deceived into thinking the taste of goods from the AOO 
region has changed), and (ii) using the same name would undermine the 
efforts and sacrifices that those in the AOO-protected region have made. 
These efforts should be rewarded, not only because of the efforts made by 
the AOO-region’s producers (and opportunities forgone, e.g., to develop 
resort complexes or mining operations), but also because they lead to the 
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maintenance of cultural heritage from which we all can derive value and 
pleasure. 
While the above proposal, owing to its narrow definition of protected 
subject matter (AOOs) provides less protection than under the Geneva Act 
(which may be understood as the type of protection the EU and its AOO-
allies would like to see promulgated worldwide) and uses a sui generis, 
rather than trademark, system of the kind privileged in the TPP (which may 
be understood as the type of protection the US and its GI-allies are willing 
to see promulgated worldwide), I consider that it strikes a measured, as 
well as doctrinally, conceptually and theoretically justified balance between 
pro- and anti-IO jurisdictions. By allowing trademark-based GIs to wither 
on the vine, while ensuring protection for AOOs strongly rooted in a 
particular place in the manner commended by the above analysis, the 
fragmented and fractious disjunctures that mark the current era of 
glocalization may be stemmed, resulting in greater harmony and comity in 
international IO law. 
 
